Cloning Credit Cards: A combined pre-play and downgrade attack on EMV Contactless
M. Roland, J. Langer - Cloning Credit Cards: A combined pre-play and downgrade attack on EMV Contactless - Proceedings of the 7th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT'13), Washington, D.C., United States of America, 2013, pp. 12
Recent roll-outs of contactless payment infrastructures -- particularly in Austria and Germany -- have raised concerns about the security of contactless payment cards and Near Field Communication (NFC). There are well-known attack scenarios like relay attacks and skimming of credit card numbers. However, banks and credit card schemes often mitigate these attacks. They explain that attacks are impractical (e.g. in a relay attack an attacker needs to have RF access to a victim's card while performing a payment transaction) or even impossible (e.g. skimmed data does not contain the dynamic authorization codes that are normally required to perform a payment transaction). This paper introduces an attack scenario on EMV contactless payment cards that permits an attacker to create functional clones of a card that contain the necessary credit card data as well as pre-played authorization codes. The card clones can then be used to perform a limited number of EMV Mag-Stripe transactions at any EMV contactless payment terminal.